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IV

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Issue No. 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the

proposed Seller Financing Addendum No. 1 ("SFA 1") to the Real Estate Purchase
Contract (the "REPC") between Johnson and the Wilsons was valid and enforceable
when it had not been executed, in writing, by Johnson or delivered to the Wilsons, by
Johnson, as required by the terms of SFA 1 ?
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009).
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment,
the District Court ruled that the REPC was a valid and enforceable agreement. (R. 605.)
Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R.
610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs.
(R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's
Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District Court entered the
March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson
filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
2.

Issue No. 2. Assuming that SFA 1 was binding on the parties, did

the District Court err in concluding that the Wilsons were not in breach of SFA 1, thereby
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excusing further performance by Johnson under the REPC, when the Wilsons failed, by
the time set for closing, to execute a promissory note and trust deed for seller financing
consistent with the terms of SFA 1?
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009) (internal quotation
omitted).
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment,
the District Court ruled that the Wilsons fully performed their obligations stated in the
REPC and that Johnson breached the REPC. (R. 605.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of
Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the
Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an
Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R.
633-34.) After the District Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's
request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on
April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The statutes of central importance to this appeal, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and
-3, are set out verbatim in Addendum A and Addendum B.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs, Scott and Tiffany Wilson (the "Wilsons") filed their Complaint
against Defendant Angela Johnson ("Johnson") on March 19, 2007, alleging that Johnson
had breached the terms of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "REPC") to sell real
property located in St. George, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-7.) The District Court
entered an interim order, the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, on August 11,
2008 in favor of the Wilsons finding that an unsigned seller financing addendum was
binding on Johnson. (R. 583-89.) The District Court then entered a Final Order and
Judgment on January 21, 2009 in favor of the Wilsons, granting a second motion for
summary judgment filed by the Wilsons, and finding that Johnson had breached the terms
of the seller financing addendum and REPC by not conveying the Property to the
Wilsons. (R. 603-07.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009,
within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment
to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District
Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and
costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Angela Johnson, ("Johnson") is the owner of property located at 704 South

Anasazi Circle, Washington, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 584.)
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2.

Johnson listed the Property for sale on or about December 1, 2006. The

Multiple Listing Service listing for the Property stated an asking price of $1,300,000.00
and stated that "Owner finance available at 30 yr fixed 4.9% interest. Call listing agent
regarding terms." (R. 102-03.)
3.

On or about January 6, 2007, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson (the

"Wilsons") offered to purchase the Property from Johnson, offering to pay $1,100,000
with the Wilsons paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of
$100,000 down and Johnson seller-financing $990,000. (R. 584.)
4.

The Wilsons' offer (the "REPC") was made on a standard Real Estate

Purchase Contract form approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. (R. 584.)
5.

The initial offer specified that the purchase price would be paid through

seller financing and contained the following language:
There [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing additional
terms. If there are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated
into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum No. 1 [X] Seller
Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption
Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in
some transactions this disclosure is required by Law) [ ] Lead-Based
Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by
Law) [X] Other (specify) Notice of Interest Addendum.
(R. 584.)
6.

Section 3 of the REPC provides as follows:

"Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or
to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, . . . (b)
any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for
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the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to
the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds.
(R. 25, 312.)
7.

Section 14 of the REPC offered by the Wilsons on January 8, 2007,

provides as follows: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of
the parties." (R. 27, 314.)
8.

Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: "'Acceptance' occurs when

Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or
counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party
or to the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required."
(R. 28, 315.)
9.

Along with the REPC the Wilsons included a seller financing addendum

("SFA 1") that specified that Johnson would provide seller financing for the Property. (R.
31-32,584.)
10.

Every addendum to the REPC, including SFA 1, contains the following

provision: "[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until
on

[ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time

(Date), to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING

ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so
accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM shall lapse."
(R. 309.)
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11.

SFA 1 provided, among other things, that $990,000.00 of the purchase

price would be financed by Johnson at a rate of 4.9% with monthly payments of
$5,250.00 per month beginning on May 1, 2007. SFA 1 had an offer expiration deadline
of 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
12.

On or about January 8, 2007, Johnson executed a counteroffer, listed as

Addendum No. 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000.00 for the purchase of the Property and
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house on the market." (R. 585.)
13.

Addendum No. 2 specifically states:

to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any
provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all
prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by this ADDENDUM
shall remain the same.
(R. 585.)
14.

Johnson's counteroffer made no mention of SFA 1, and made no changes to

any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 12 above. (R. 585.)
15.

On that same date, the Wilsons executed Addendum No. 3, counter-

offering the following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (b) in lieu of 72 hour clause,
settlement to be 2-23-07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released
to seller on 2-10-07; and (d) all other terms and conditions to remain the same. (R. 585.)
16.

On the same date, Johnson signed both the REPC and Addendum No. 3, but

did not sign SFA 1. (R. 585.)
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17.

Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 1 nor did she sign SFA

1. Neither Johnson nor her agent expressed to the Wilsons or their agent consent to SFA
1 or its terms. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
18.

Nearly one month after the REPC and Addendum No. 3 were signed by

Johnson, on February 8, 2007, Johnson received a second proposed Seller Financing
Addendum from the Wilsons ("SFA 2"). SFA 2 did not specify the amount of seller
financing but offered the same interest rate as SFA 1 and listed the monthly payment as
$5,250.00 per month. However, SFA 2 then specified the monthly payment amount as
"P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for principle [sic] and interest
breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 per month. 2 Months taxed
[sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." Again, the proposed terms were
not satisfactory to Johnson. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 2 nor
did she sign SFA 2 or communicate acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent.
(R. 104, 322-23.)
19.

On or about February 10, 2007, Johnson received the $20,000 earnest

money deposit check and negotiated it. (R. 586.)
20.

The Settlement Deadline for the Wilsons' purchase of the Property was

February 23, 2007, pursuant to Addendum No. 3. (R. 104, 320.)
21.

On or about February 23, 2007, at approximately 12:00 p.m. Johnson hand-

delivered a proposed Seller Financing Addendum to the closing office, Atlas Title, on
terms acceptable to Johnson at the reduced purchase price of $1,150,000.00, for
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execution by the Wilsons ("SFA 3")- SFA 3 had an offer acceptance date of February 23,
2007 at 5:00 p.m. Johnson never received an executed copy of SFA 3 from the Wilsons
or their agent. (R. 104,325-26.)
22.

In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from the Wilsons' initial offer

to the final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or SFA 1,
which stated that Johnson would finance $990,000 as the seller and that the Wilsons
would pay a total of $110,000 as a down payment. (R. 585.)
23.

By close of business on February 23, 2007, the date set for closing, the

Wilsons tendered a total of $118,625.42 (calculated as the earnest money deposit of
$20,000.00 delivered to Johnson on or before February 10, 2007, plus $98,625.42
delivered to the closing office on February 23, 2007) and a promissory note and trust
deed for seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00.

The HUD-1 Settlement

Statement which the Wilsons executed and delivered to the closing office provided for
seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000. (R. 334, 255-56, 258.)
24.

None of the REPC, SFA 1, SFA 2, or SFA 3 provide for seller financing in

the amount of $1,035,000.00. Neither Johnson nor her agent, Meri Crandall, agreed to or
communicated agreement to that amount of seller financing to the Wilsons, Mr. Larkin,
or the closing office. (R. 334, 274.)
25.

On February 23, 2007, Johnson went to the title company and signed most

of the closing documents, but did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement showing
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seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the transaction did not close. (R.
604.)
26.

At no time did Johnson or the Wilsons provide the closing office with a

document signed by all the parties which provides for seller financing in the amount of
$1,035,000.00. (R.255.)
27.

Following the settlement deadline of February 23, 2007, Wilsons withdrew

the sum of $98,625.42 from the closing office. (R. 256.)
28.

On February 26, 2007 (three days after the settlement deadline had

expired), the Wilsons caused a Notice of Interest in Real Property (the "NOI") to be
recorded against the Property in the official records of Washington County, Utah. (R.
328, 334.)
29.

Nowhere in the Wilsons' initial offer, any other documents signed by the

parties or even in the unexecuted SFA 1 and SFA 2 is there any reference nor did the
parties ever discuss or agree to seller financing of a specific percentage of the total
purchase price (90% or otherwise). (R. 103-04, 110-19, 123-26.)
30.

According to the custom and practice of the Utah residential real estate

industry, both parties to a standardized REPC must execute and accept an addendum to
the REPC in order for the terms of the addendum to be included in the purchase and sale
transaction.

This requirement of dual execution and mutual acceptance enables an

escrow officer and real estate agent to know which addenda represent the agreement of
the parties and are to be included in the closing. (R. 445, 448.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in ruling that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson since
Johnson did not accept SFA 1 in accordance with its stated terms. In order to accept SFA
1, thereby making it binding on both Johnson and the Wilsons, Johnson was required to
sign SFA 1 and communicate to the Wilsons that SFA 1 had been accepted. Johnson did
neither. By its own express terms, the Wilsons offer for seller financing, on the terms set
forth in SFA 1, lapsed when it was not accepted by Johnson.
Assuming SFA 1 was enforceable against Johnson, the Wilsons breached its
terms. SFA 1 provided for seller financing in the amount of $990,000.00. The Wilsons
never executed a promissory note or trust deed or other seller financing document in the
amount of $990,000.00. Instead, at closing, the Wilsons tendered seller financing
documents in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and insisted Johnson close. Johnson never
agreed to seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the Wilsons, not Johnson,
breached the terms of the REPC and SFA 1. The Wilsons' breach excused any further
performance from Johnson.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SFA 1 WAS
BINDING ON JOHNSON SINCE IT WAS NEVER ACCEPTED BY
JOHNSON.
A.

Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 as Required by Its Express
Terms.

In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered August 11, 2008, the
Court concluded that SFA 1, which was offered to Johnson by the Wilsons in conjunction
with the REPC, was binding upon Johnson even though she never signed SFA 1 nor
communicated her assent. (R. 586-87.) The Wilsons set a deadline for SFA 1 to be
accepted by 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 309.) SFA 1 stated that it could only be
accepted by Johnson "in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC" and
that "[ujnless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse." (R.
309) (emphasis added). Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows:
"Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer
of the other; (a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate
acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
(R. 315) (emphasis added). At no time did Johnson sign SFA 1, nor did she or her agent
communicate to the Wilsons or their agent that SFA 1 had been signed or that Johnson
had accepted the terms of SFA 1. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.)
SFA 1 constituted an offer and the manner of acceptance of the offer was clearly
described by its express terms. "When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner. Otherwise mutual assent is
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lacking, and no contract is formed." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. David
E. Ross II, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993); see also Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders
Trust, 1999 UT App 159, *2 ("[W]hen the terms of a contract provide for the method of
acceptance, acceptance can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed
method") (unpublished opinion).

Johnson failed to sign SFA 1 or otherwise

communicate her acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent by 5:00 p.m. on
January 8, 2007 (the offer acceptance deadline chosen by the Wilsons). Accordingly,
SFA 1 lapsed and did not become part of the REPC when Johnson accepted Addendum
No. 3.
B.

The Wilsons' Conduct Demonstrates That They Understood that SFA 1
Had Lapsed and That the Parties Had Not Reached an Agreement
Regarding Seller Financing.

The Wilsons' conduct after the lapse of SFA 1 demonstrates that they understood
that SFA 1 had lapsed and was not part of the REPC. On February 8, 2007, the Wilsons
sent to Johnson a second Seller Financing Addendum, SFA 2, which did not specify the
amount of seller financing and which detailed a different monthly payment amount than
SFA 1. (R. 104, 322-23.) Where SFA 1 simply stated that payments would be $5,250.00
per month, SFA 2 stated "P&I $5493.02 per month.

See amortization schedule for

principle [sic] and interest breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00
per month. 2 Months taxed [sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." (R.
322.) Further, SFA 1 required the Wilsons to deliver the following to Johnson or the
closing office by the close of business on February 23, 2007: (a) a promissory note in the
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amount of $990,000.00 and (b) the sum of $160,000.00 (representing the difference
between the total purchase price and the portion of the purchase price to be seller
financed pursuant to the amounts set forth in SFA 1). (R. 308, 320.) The Wilsons did not
deliver the required funds and documents by February 23, 2007; instead they delivered
$118,625.42 ($20,000.00 in earnest money plus $98,625.42 at closing on February 23,
2007) and a promissory note in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 334, 256, 586.) The
Wilsons' own conduct—which is entirely inconsistent with the stated terms of SFA 1—
demonstrates that SFA 1 was not agreed to by the parties and was not incorporated into
the REPC.
C.

Enforcement of SFA 1 Would Violate the Statute of Frauds and Fail to
Give Effect to the REPC's Provisions Regarding Amendment.

The REPC is within the Utah Statute of Frauds. "[A]n offer to purchase [real
estate] when accepted creates an interest in real estate and is within the statute of frauds."
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Utah 1986). Section 25-5-1 of Utah Code
Annotated (Sections 25-5-1 et seq. referred to as the "Utah Statute of Frauds") provides
in relevant part:
No estate or interest in real property,. . . shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same.
Section 25-5-3 of Utah Code Annotated further provides in relevant part:

"Every

contract . . . for the sale, of any lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
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whom the lease or sale is to be made." The Utah Supreme Court stated in Golden Key
Realty, Inc. v. PJ. Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) that "[t]he rule is well settled
in Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the
requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Each addendum to the REPC,
including SFA 1, represents a subsequent agreement which modifies the REPC.
The express terms of the REPC are consistent with the Utah Statute of Frauds.
Section 14 of the REPC states: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written
agreement of the parties." (R. 314.) As mentioned above, each addendum to the REPC
requires the offeree to accept the offer/addendum by signing the addendum and
transmitting her acceptance of the same to the offeror. The terms of the REPC cannot be
modified or added upon except through a subsequent written agreement signed by the
parties.
In Williams, the seller under a real estate purchase contract failed to accept an
offer to purchase property owned by her and her husband as joint tenants by the offer
acceptance deadline set by the buyer. The seller later attempted to ratify her husband's
timely acceptance of the offer. The Utah Supreme Court held that the seller's attempt to
accept the offer (or ratify her husband's prior acceptance) after the offer had lapsed was
ineffectual.

Id. at 424. The Court stated that the seller's theory of "open-ended

ratification .. . would play havoc with the laws of offer and acceptance." Id.
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Likewise, the Wilsons' argument, and the District Court's ruling, that a party to a
real estate purchase contract can be bound to the terms of an addendum which she has not
signed in accordance with the terms of the addendum would "play havoc" with the laws
of offer and acceptance in the context of residential real estate purchases. Under the
Wilsons' theory of the law, parties to a residential real estate purchase contract, their
agents, and closing offices would be uncertain as to which addenda were binding and
which were not. While the Wilsons' position would lead to chaos, the express terms of
the REPC and addenda and relevant Utah statutory and case law lend themselves to
clarity, consistency, and the mutual assent of the parties.
Finally, "[a] court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 'harmonize and
give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, <|[
30, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). To adopt the Wilsons' position and affirm the
District Court's ruling would be to render superfluous the provisions in each addendum
which require acceptance by a certain deadline and in accordance with the "acceptance"
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. It would also render superfluous Section 14 of the
REPC, requiring amendments to be in writing. Finally, it would render the acceptance,
rejection, and counter-offer provision and signature block on each addendum superfluous,
since the offeree could be bound by the terms of the addendum without ever signing it.
In sum, the District Court erred in finding that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WILSONS
DID NOT BREACH THE REPC SINCE THE WILSONS FAILED TO
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS OR PROVIDE THE CONSIDERATION
REQUIRED BY SFA 1.
A.

The Wilsons Breached the REPC and SFA 1 By Failing to Execute a
Promissory Note and Trust Deed in the Amount of $990,000.00.

Johnson did not breach the terms of the REPC when she refused to sign the HUD1 Settlement Statement on February 23, 2007. The REPC provided for seller financing in
the amount for $990,000.00. (R. 585.) Likewise, SFA 1, which the District Court found
to be binding on Johnson even though she did not sign it or deliver it to Wilsons, clearly
stated that the amount for seller financing was $990,000.00. (R. 585.) The Wilsons have
not produced any document signed by the parties which states a different amount of seller
financing or any other agreement executed by Johnson recognizing a different amount of
seller financing. Therefore, the REPC and SFA 1, assuming it was binding on the parties,
required the Wilsons, as buyers, to tender a promissory note and trust deed in the amount
of $990,000.00 and cash in the amount of $140,000.00 (calculated as the total purchase
price of $1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in
the amount of $990,000.00) to Johnson or the closing office by close of business on
February 23, 2007. Instead, the Wilsons tendered $98,625.42 in cash along with a
promissory note and trust deed in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 586.) Johnson never
agreed to seller financing in this amount. It is the Wilsons who breached the terms of the
REPC and SFA 1, not Johnson.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,414
(Utah 1998) stated the well established rule that:
When one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material failure' in
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty
to continue to perform under the contract. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 237 (1981). This general rule is based on the principle that
where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises,
each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called upon to
perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the expected
exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of
performance by the other party.
Likewise, in Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Utah 1972), the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that:
The law regarding the rights under a contract of one who first breaches it is
set out in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 365, as follows: As a rule, a party first
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on
performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other
party for a subsequent failure to perform. . . . It has also been said that
where a contract is not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach
is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the
nonperformance.
The Wilsons' failure to tender the agreed upon amount of cash and a promissory note for
the required amount of seller financing constituted a material breach or failure to perform
under the REPC and excused Johnson from further performance.
B.

The REPC and SFA 1 Do Not Provide for Ninety Percent Seller
Financing.

The Wilsons argued below, and the District Court impliedly found, that the
Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA because the REPC and SFA 1 were intended
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to provide that Johnson seller finance ninety percent (90%) of the purchase price of the
Property. (R. 552-53, 586-87.) The only evidence that the Wilsons offered in support of
this contention was Scott Wilson's unexpressed intent. (R. 356.) Johnson disputed that
she ever had this intent and the Wilsons themselves do not contend that they ever even
spoke with Johnson regarding this version of the REPC and SFA 1. There is no
document agreed to by Johnson or even prepared by Wilsons expressing this intent. The
REPC and SFA 1 are clear on their face—Johnson is to provide seller financing in the
amount of $990,000.00. The District Court's wholesale rewrite of the REPC and SFA 1
is inconsistent with the statute of frauds and should be reversed. Johnson did not breach
the terms of the REPC or SFA 1. Rather the Wilsons did in failing to tender the proper
amounts.
At its core, the Wilsons' contention is that the $50,000.00 gap between the
purchase price initially offered by the Wilsons ($1,100,000.00) and the purchase price
ultimately agreed to ($1,150,000.00), which is not addressed in any of the documentation
surrounding this transaction, should be absorbed by Johnson as part of "seller financing."
This contention, which was accepted by the District Court, is inconsistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). In Reed, the
Utah Supreme Court, while interpreting a contract for the purchase of real property for
$70,000.00 upon "terms to be arranged," stated that "[w]here there is no agreement
concerning the terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of
the contract by requiring full payment at the time of the tender of the conveyance." Id. at
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1378-79 (emphasis added). This principle has subsequently been relied on and applied
by the Utah Court of Appeals: "More troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the
seller financing in the agreement. However, such uncertainty does not invalidate a
contract. Rather, a requirement of full cash payment at closing will be implied'' Dunn v.
Prichard, 2001 UT App 252, *1 n.l (citing Reed, 610 P.2d at 1378-79) (emphasis added)
(unpublished opinion).
In this case, again assuming that SFA 1 is enforceable even though it was never
"accepted" by Johnson according to SFA 1 's own terms, the principles articulated in
Reed and Dunn, as well as the structure of the REPC1, require the uncertainty regarding
the allocation of the additional $50,000 to be resolved in Johnson's favor by requiring the
Wilsons to pay $140,000 in cash at closing (calculated as the total purchase price of
$1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in the
amount of $990,000.00). The Wilsons only paid $98,625.42 in cash at closing. (R. 586.)
Consequently, the Wilsons failed to tender the required cash payment of $140,000 at
closing and thereby materially breached the REPC. This material breach excused any
1

Paragraph 2 of the REPC, which sets forth the purchase price for the subject property,
specifies the terms of payment in paragraph 2.1 by subtracting each type of payment from
the total purchase price. (R. 24, 311.) Therefore, from the total purchase price of
$1,150,000, the REPC first subtracts any earnest money paid. (R. 24, 311.) Then, the
REPC subtracts any amounts provided by a new loan, the buyer's assumption of an
existing loan, seller financing, and/or any "other" payment. (R. 24, 311.) Finally, after
all other methods of payment have been allocated, the "Balance of Purchase Price [is
due] in Cash at Settlement." (R. 24, 311.) This structure of the REPC supports the
principle stated in Reed and Dunn because all amounts required for full payment of the
purchase price not otherwise provided for in the REPC are due in cash at the time of
closing.
19

obligation Johnson had to convey the Property or to render any further performance
under the REPC.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor
of the Wilsons because it erred in concluding that (i) SFA 1 was binding on Johnson even
though she never signed it in the manner specified by the REPC for it to be accepted and
(ii) the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 when they failed to tender a
promissory note and trust deed for seller financing in the amounts specified in SFA 1.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009.

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

Andrew V. Collins
Attorneys for Appellant

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this l(ci

day of October, 2009,1 caused two (2) true and

correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via U.S. Mail,
first-class postage prepaid, on the following:
Michael F. Leavitt
Durham Jones & Pinegar
192 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770

jfadKt
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ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3

C.

Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders Trust, 1999 UT App 159 (unpublished)

D.

Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UT App 252 (unpublished)

E.

Real Estate Purchase Contract (R. 24-29, 111-16)

F.

Seller Financing Addendum 1 (R. 118-19)

G.

Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R. 583-89)

H.

Final Order and Judgment (R. 603-07)
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LEXSTATUCA 25-5-1
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/2009); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) *
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CASES) *
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2009)
§ 25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 &C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; RS. 1933 &C. 1943,33-5-1.
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LEXSTAT UCA 25-5-3
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. *
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/2009); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) *
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CASES) *
TITLE 25. FRAUD
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2009)
§ 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463; C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-3.
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LexisNexis*
LEXSEE 1999 UT APP 159
Daniel J. Phelps, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Jean Smith Sanders
Trust, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
Case No. 971575-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
1999 UT App 159; 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 292

May 13,1999, Filed
NOTICE:
CATION

[*1]

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-

PRIOR HISTORY:
Second District, Farmington
Department. The Honorable Jon M. Memmott
DISPOSITION:

must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order
to create a contract."). Therefore, the issue is whether
Phelps accepted Sanders's counteroffer by initialing the
contract. Whether a contract [*2] exists is question of
law that we review for correctness. See Hughes & Sons
Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct App. 1992).

Affirmed and remanded.

COUNSEL: Craig S. Cook and George B. Handy, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Douglas M. Durbano and Stanley L. Ballif, Layton, for
Appellee
JUDGES: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding
Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge
OPINION BY: Pamela T. Greenwood
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTEROFFER
Both parties agree that at the June 26, 1995, meeting the
time for acceptance of plaintiffs offer had lapsed, resulting in Sanders's signature on the contract becoming a
counteroffer. See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180,
185, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971) ("An offeror who
receives an acceptance which is too late or which is otherwise defective, cannot at his election regard it as valid.
The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer which

Sanders correctly argues that when the terms of a contract provide for the method of acceptance, acceptance
can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed method. SeeCrane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd.,
11A P.2d 3, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In making an offer,
the offeror may specify the manner in which the offer
must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the specified manner, mutual assent is lacking and no contract is
formed."). In this case, the contract required the parties
to the contract to "sign the offer or counter offer where
noted to indicate acceptance." (Emphasis added.) The
contract also included a signature line at the bottom of
the document. Therefore, we must determine whether
initialing the contract constituted a signature for purposes
of accepting the counteroffer.
In Jaffe v. Gibbons, 290 S.C. 468, 351 S.E.2d 343 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1986), the court addressed the question of
whether initialing a contract for the sale of real estate
was tantamount to an acceptance of [*3] a counteroffer
when the contract required a signature for acceptance.
See id. at 346. In holding that there was a meeting of the
minds such that a valid contract was formed, the court
noted that generally when two parties to a transaction
both sign a document, that document becomes a valid,
enforceable contract. See id. at 345. Under circumstances
similar to this case, the court held that "when [the buyer]
initialed the [changes to the contract], he accepted the
counter offer, thereby creating a binding contract." Id. at
346. Furthermore, the court held that although the buyer
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"only initialed and did not sign his full name to the deletions, the initials, in our opinion, amount to both a signing and an acceptance by Jaffe of the counter offer " Id
see also 17A Am Jur 2d Contracts § 188 (1991) (initialing a contract is as effective in binding a party thereto as a full signature)
In this case, the trial court found, and neither party disputes, that each party understood the terms of the contract and mtended to enter mto a bmdmg contract
Therefore, we conclude that Phelps's signature via his
initials on the contract [*4] constituted a valid acceptance of Sanders's counteroffer l
1 We find no merit in Sanders's argument that
Phelps's signature was not placed in the correct
location and thus rendered the contract invalid
See PIO v John B Gilliland Constr Inc 276
Ore 975, 560 P 2d 247, 250 (Ore 1976) (holdmg
signature placed anywhere on a contract is sufficient to authenticate it)
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Utah's statute of frauds provides that all interests in real
property "shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same " Utah Code Ann § 25-5-1 (1998), see also
Commercial Union Assocs v Clayton, 863 P 2d 29, 33
(Utah Ct App 1993) (" a document to be enforceable
under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the
party granting the conveyance"' (emphasis added)(quoting [*5] Williams v Singleton, 723 P 2d 421,
424 (Utah 1986))), petition for cert filed, 231 Utah Adv
Rep 24 (Utah 1994)
The contract at issue is clearly a sufficient writing memorializing the parties' intent to convey real property
Furthermore, the contract is signed by Sanders - the

party conveying the land and the party against whom
enforcement is sought, therefore, the contract in this case
satisfies the statute of frauds
ATTORNEY FEES
Phelps argues the trial court erred in refusing to award
him attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under
the contract However, Phelps did not raise the issue of
attorney fees under the contract either in his complamt or
motion for summary judgment and thus waived his right
to attorney fees below See Lee v Barnes, 977 P 2d 550,
1999 UT App 126, 367 Utah Adv Rep 40, 41 (Utah Ct
App 1999) (holding party waived right to attorney fees
because "attorney fees were never mentioned at oral argument" and party failed "to properly address the issue to
the trial court") Nevertheless, Phelps is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand
to the trial court for a determination [*6] and award of
these fees
Finally, Phelps argues that he should be awarded attorney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code
because Sanders's defense was in bad faith See Utah
Code Ann § 78-27-56 (1996 & Supp 1998) We disagree Trial courts are accorded broad discretion in awarding attorney fees based on an opposmg party's bad faith
See Valcarce v Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d 305, 316 (Utah
1997) Because Sanders has failed to show the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees to
Phelps under section 78-27-56, we affirm the trial court's
denial of attorney fees on this basis
Affirmed and remanded
Pamela T Greenwood, Associate Presidmg Judge
WE CONCUR
Russell W Bench, Judge
Norman H Jackson, Judge
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LexisNexis*
LEXSEE2001UTAPP252
Douglas W. Dunn and Ruth E. Dunn, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
Agnes Prichard; Seven Prichard; Jean S. Kump aka Wanda Jean Kump, trustee of
the Jean S. Kump Trust; and Delbert Keith Kump and Jodi Sue Dembowski, personal representatives of the Shirl R. Kump Estate, Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 20000823-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2001 UT App 252; 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 412

August 30, 2001, Filed
NOTICE:
CATION

[*1]

NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-

PRIOR HISTORY:
Eighth District, Vernal Department. The Honorable John R. Anderson
DISPOSITION:
and remanded.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part

COUNSEL: Daniel S. Sam, Vernal, for Appellants
Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Vernal, for
Appellees
JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge, William
A. Thome, Jr., Judge
OPINION BY: Gregory K. Orme
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
ORME, Judge:
The lack of earnest money, omission of a closing date,
and identification of other terms as "N.A." do not render
the contract unenforceable in this case, for essentially the
reasons argued by appellants. l Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. However, it does not follow that appellants are
entitled to summary judgment.

1 More troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the seller financing called for in the
agreement. However, such uncertainty does not
invalidate a contract. Rather, a requirement of full
cash payment at closing will be implied. See Reed
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 1980).
[*2] In their motion for summary judgment, appellees contended that appellants led them to believe that
what they signed was merely a preliminary document
appellants could use to help determine if financing could
be obtained and was not intended to be a binding contract for the sale of real estate. Appellants challenge this
contention factually, but also argue that extrinsic evidence regarding the intention of the parties and their
discussions leading up to the signing of the document is
not admissible to vary the terms of an integrated contract.
While this precept is generally true, Utah courts
have long held that "parole evidence is admissible to
show the circumstances under which the contract was
made or the purpose for which the writing was executed." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665
(Utah 1985). See also Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980)(indicating parole
evidence was properly admitted to show that signed
notes were represented as being "just a formality" in obtaining loans and not intended by defendants to be contracts); Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122
(Utah 1948) [*3] (explaining parole evidence is admissible to show that what appears to be a warranty deed
was actually given only for security purposes).
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Particularly insightful is the case of Union Bank v.
Swenson, where a unanimous Utah Supreme Court held
that allegations, such as those made by the appellees in
this case, "raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the parties assented to the writing as a final
statement of the intended agreement or executed it for
some other purpose." 707 P.2d at 666. The Union Bank
Court further explained that "parole evidence, indeed any
relevant evidence, is admissible" to assist a court in determining whether a writing was intended by the parties
to be a fully integrated agreement. Id. at 665.
Thus, appellees' contention in this regard is not foreclosed as a matter of law. The relevant material facts

are in dispute, however, meaning the claim cannot be
resolved on summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of
appellants' summary judgment motion, reverse the trial
court's grant of appellees' summary judgment motion,
and remand for trial or such other [*4] proceedings as
may now be appropriate.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge

Addendum E

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This is a legally binding contract Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this form Buyer and Seller however may agree to alter or
delete its provisions or to use a different form If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

°£?fsr^^£hase

Buver S m t t ft Tiffany Wilson

the P r

°P e r t y

described below and hereoy delivers to the Brokerage as Earnest Money, the amount of S__U.UQQ.00 in the form of
Check
which upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23)
shall be deposited in accordance with state law
Received by

on

(Date)

(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money)

Brokerage

Fxit R e d Rock Realty

Phone Number 4 3 5 - 9 8 6 - 0 2 2 0
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1.

PROPERTY:

7Q4 5 ^NAS^ZI Cic-'e Wasrtnc on UT 3^730

also described as Indian Oaks Subdivision Lot #24
City of W a s h i n g t o n

County of W a s h i n g t o n

State of Utah Zip 8 4 7 8 0

(the ' Property")

1.1 Included Items Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to
the Property plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment, ceiling fans, water heater, built-in appliances, light
fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains, draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors and windows,
window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, satellite dishes and system, permanently affixed carpets, automatic
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s), fencing, and trees and shrubs The following items shall also be
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title
Ail items outlined m MLS arofle 'o a(sc include aU Ixtures bu»l(-<n „cdreU*enter«a<r>rreot centers electronic I recreattooat ?Quiomer( on prermas al effer cate that -r\av or m a / <\m se n he MLS profile

1.2 Excluded Items The following items are excluded from this sale

All mmovahlfi furniture such as heris, linpns, flatware tahlfis ft r.hairs..
1.3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale

NA

_ _

_

2.

PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ 1 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows
S
20,000 00
(a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
$__
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2 3 Buyer will apply
for one or more of the following loans [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ] VA
[ ] OTHER (specify)
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum
If the loan is to include any particular terms then check below and give details
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
S_
$ 990T000.00
$
$
90.000.00

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
Other (specify).
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement

Si 100 000 00

PURCHASE PRICE Total of lines (a) through (f)

2 2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a)
[ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable
loan(s) referenced in Section 2 1(b) or (c) (the "Loan") This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition *
(D)
I x l Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan
Section 2 3 does not apply
}
/
r *
Page 1 of 6 pages
Seller's initials
Date
Buyer's lnitials_^_________ Date (/v/&
~7

fTSuveS l e s
No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced ,n Section 24(a) Buyer shall
i f ( 1 i o l n "i nin ADD icat.on" occurs only when Buyer has (i) completed signed and delivered to the lender (the
?,PPPyH A the S a l
toa^aSSS^a«31^ertaUon
required by the Lender and (,.) Pa,d all loan application fees as
requSd b j m e S n 6 e T B^erlSees
to d.hgently work to obtain the Loan Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any
a««t-onal ^ ^ ^ ^ X ^ S i ^ S n ^ d
If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender
b) p r o c e ° u r e " ' u
"7 f L
D
r ) B u y e r sh aii no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a
does not W r o v e j h e Loan a ^ ^ o a n ^ e ^
Y
^
^
^
$ receipf ^ ^
cancel ^
d by
copy to Seller ^ e r or S^ler may w,i
Cancellation under this Section 2 3(b) (i) if the Notice of Loan
& e n V 2 n ^ r e c e , v e d by^ Buyer no la'teMhan the Loan Denial Deadline referenced ,n Section 24(d) the Earnest Money
Denial was received DyB"y«
,
received by Buyer after that date the Earnest
f L
Q
S P ? n S s f s n a ^ b e re eased to S . l e r a n S s e l L agrees to accept as Sel.er s exclusive remedy the Earnest Money
^ n e y D ^ o s r t shall ^ e l ^ e a l
* v l d e d , n t h ( S section 2 3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing
e
cance| as
S o n set forth ,n S e S 2 2(a) Cancelation pursuant to the provisions of any other secUon of this Contract shall be
90Ve m e

2 4 ADDrSa"sSl CoendP,?oVr°Bnuyer s obligation to purchase the Property [X] IS [ ] IS NOT cond.tioned upon the Property
ooPPor nntlPssthan?the Purchase Price This cond.tion is referred to as the "Appraisal Condition If the Appraisal
P
C ond,r n 9 apptes and he Buye" recedes wnt.en notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for .ess than the
Cond.tion applies; ancj me e»uy
c a n c e , t h | S contract by providing a copy of such written notice
S ' S B K n o " S i thanthree d r a f t e r Buyers receipt of such written notice In the event of a cancellation under this
<°J,fnn \ 4 S if the NoSce of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced in
S
r
24(e
the^Earnest
Money Deposit
shall be returned
to Buyer
(„)
of Appraised^Value
received by
Section
24
e the
honest money
P
^
^ if^ the
^ Notice
^
^ a c cwas
be ^
Se||er
ept ag Se||efS
S s i v e reme y the S n l s t Money Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to cance, as provided in this Section 2 4
s h a S e delmfd a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section
of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions
3

SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING

c c t t i o n w chall take Dlace on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f) or on a date upon which Buyer and
l e l . S e 5 ? w S i n g ' "Segment" shall occur only when all of the following have been completed (a) Buyer and Sejer
have stoned and dehvered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract by the
S P
S i
escrow instructions or by applicable law (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these
S m e n t s ( e x S for thTproceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office
t X form of c S c t e d or cleared funds and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have
been d ^ r e d by SeHerfo Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer
S
S o a v one half (V9 of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing
o J o c e s s T K L and asses ments for the current year rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at
Settlement as setforth in this Section Tenant deposits (including but not limited to secunty deposits cleaning deposits
f n d o r e o a d rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth m this Section shall be
made I s of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f) unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties
S h w n t i n g could mclude the settlement statement The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been
completedI and when all of the following have been completed (.) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by
me Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the
office of the county recorder The actions described in parts (.) and (.«) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within
four calendar days of Settlement
4

POSSESSION Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within [ ]

hours [ ] J

days after Closing,

t ] Other (specify)
5
(

CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract
] Seller's Initials ( ^ | W e r , s Initials
t

e

represents M Sel.er [ ] Buyer[

The Listing Broker P-OI D W E U RANKFR PREMIER
11 ic u.ou. y
—

represents M Seller { ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
a s a (jrruterj Agent,

Page 2 of 6 pages

Sellers Initials

Date

Buyer's I n U i a i s ^ ^ ^

l ^ ^ J ^

l

The Listing Agent J V l E f i L ^ R A T i D A L J

Date ^ V / T

' '

,7

The Selling Agent J E R E M Y J ^ B K l i ^

represents [ ] Seller [X] Buyer [ ] both

B u ^ r ^ t e r

The Selling Broker _ E X U ^ £ O ^ Q £ K ^ H A ^

represents [ ] Seller [X] Buyer [ ] b o t h j u y e ^

fi TITLE INSURANCE At Settlement Seller agrees to pay for a standard coverage owner s policy of title insurance
fns J.nc["Buyer inlhe"amount of the Purchase Price Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer s expense
T CF. i P R DISCLOSURES No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Seller shall provide
to Buyer fhe following documents which are collectively referred to as the Seller Disclosures
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property signed and dated by Seller
b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance
r a roov of anv leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing
d) wn«en
(d)
- notice o?any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning code violations and
(e) Other (specify)
8 BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS Buyers obligation to purchase
under this Contract (check applicable boxes)
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in
Section 7
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property
(c) [ I I S IX] iS NOT conditioned upon Buyer s approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ( Survey")
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the cost terms and availability of homeowner s insurance
coverage for the Property
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property (specify)

_gr£iipss'nn^l Hnmfi & Termite Inspection
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative then Sections 8 1 8 2 8 3 and 8 4 apply otherwise they do not
apply The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the 'Evaluations & Inspections " Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walkthrough inspection under Section 11
8 1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section
24(c) Buyer shall (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections are
acceptable to Buyer
8 2 Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable Buyer may
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline either (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer or (b) provide Seller with wntten notice of objections
8 3 Failure to Respond If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel
this Contract as provided in Section 8 2, or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer
8 4 Response by Seller If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period') in which to agree in writing upon the manner of
resolving Buyer's objections Except as provided in Section 10 2, Seller may but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
objections If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may
cancel this Contract by providing wntten notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Penod whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under
this Section 8 4 Buyer s objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer This waiver shall not affect those items warranted in
Section 10
9 ADDITIONAL TERMS There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms If there are
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference [ ] Addendum No _J
[ X ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead Based Paint
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint
Addendum
(in
some transactions
this
addendum
is
required
by
law)
[
x
]
Other
(specify)
N o t } c e Q f | n t e r e g t A d d e n d u m
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Seller's Initials
Date
Buyer's I m t i a l s ^ u l
Date / / v / V "' /

10 SELLER W A R R A N T E S 8 ^ ^ f ^ J Y J S s L t Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and
10 1
Cond.t.on of Title Seller represem na
^
howeve
{ ^
{Q ( h e R r o p e r t y
marketable title to Buyer•* C o s i n g b o r ^ n e J ^ a ^ t y d ° l f r e s t n c y t i o n s 9 C C & R ' s (meaning covenants conditions and
subject to the following matters of record e a s e m .
Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer
restr.ct.ons) and nghts-of-wa>-andsubgt tcthe contents o J
^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^ ^
under Section 8 Buyer also agrees to take je Property su ,
n * m e o w n e r s assoc.3t,on dues utilit.es, and other
pnor to Closing Buyer^agrees to ^ ^ W e £ ? p ? £ a n y , oa n(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2 1(c).
services provided to the P r . 0 ^ r t y f ^ ' ° S ' „ 9 m o r t q a i e S trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's hens, tax Hens and warrants
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing, all ^ g S s V e n t s and homeowners association dues
Se.ierwii. c a u s e ^ p a j i curr^ntby ^ ^ ^ s T a t the^roperty w.l. be ,n the following condition ON THE DATE
S E

^ ^ o

dam

V

p f

r t

y S £ ^ b ^ m - S a n a n d freTof d e m a n d persona, belongings Any Seller or tenant mov.ng-related

fbf thJhea'tlnTcltg! e ^ ^ f p ^ S ' ^ ^

systems and fixtures, and the appliances andfireplacesw,«.

be in workmq order and fit for their intended purposes,

fit fonts ^ ^ r p w e . a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

^

^

| a n d s c a p , n g | W l l l b e i n t h e s a m e g e n eral

condition as they were on

the date of Acceptance
Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10 3 is separate from the
10.3
Home Warranty Plan The H ^ ^ n r y
. A one.yeaf H
eck
g bo
warranties provided by Seller under ^ " s 10 Jj n a
* , f i n c | u S e d t h e H o m e W a r r a n t y P l a n shall be
W rran
!
jl*£," ^ i L ^ \ X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ « V
selected by [Xl Buyer [ ] Seller The cost of the Home
w S t y P.2n S f not exceed ? ^ 0 0 0 and shall & paid & at Settlement by [ ] Buyer t X] Seller
•M W A I K THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time
11. WALK-THROUGH i N ^ t o
dete rm.ne only that the Property is "as represented, meaning that
conduct a ^ ' ^ " ^ J S f ? " g 4 and 10 2 ("the items") are respect.vely present, repaired/changed as agreed, and
the items referenced ."!SeeJons V » 4 ana
^
d S e l l e r wl||.
r t 0 settlement, replace, correc or repair the
H
,n the warranted condition 1thenews ate
a pp!lcable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same
terns or, with * ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ i S X c J to'daim that an item » not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver
^ ^ J i S ^ o ^ ^ ^ S t da?e of possession, the .terns as represented
„ r u A u r F , n . I R 1 N G TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of
12. CHANGES DURING I ™ " & * ~ ' ~ w n t t e n COnSent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made (b)
t h e f
° w T a ^ ^
improvements "to the Property shall be made or
undSaten and (df no lurthtr financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made
«.^.w ^r- c.rwcDQ if Riivpr or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or
^
^
!
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
SeCh°a.? w a r r a n t ^ , or hir authority to do so and to b.nd Buyer and
Seller
, ^ . o ! CTIT rnMTRACT This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT, I M S ^ P H
y
supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations.
S p S S S b S s . l T a ^ T ^ * ^ 9 s o r c K a d s betwee'n the part.es This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The part.es agree that any d.spute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to th.s Contract
(check applicable box)
[ X l MAY AT THE OPTION ^ T H E P A R T ^
first be submitted to medat.on: If thepartes agree to

^
v

s u b m ( t t e d tQ m e d i a t l o n t h r o u g h a

^

of

^

^

|f m e d i a t ) o n

^ ^ ^ S ^ S S S ' ^ ^ S S a^aJabKnJer th.s c'ontLfshall apply Noth.ng .n th.s Sect.on 15 shall proh.b.t
a^y party from ?eek,ng emergency equ.table relief pend.ng med.at.on
16 DEFAULT

If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to reta.n the Earnest Money^epos.t as l.qu.dated d a m a g e s ^ to
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Seller's In.t.als

Date

Buyer's I m t l a j f f i K . '

Date///fr O

7

return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law If Seller defaults in
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
available at law If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section
2 3(b)
17 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract the prevailing
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees However attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation
in mediation under Section 15
18 NOTICES Except as provided in Section 23 all notices required under this Contract must be (a) in writing (b) signed
by the party giving notice and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date
referenced in this Contract
19 ABROGATION Except for the provisions of Sections 10 1, 10 2 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing
20 RISK OF LOSS All risk of Joss to the Property including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract (a) performance under each Section
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5 00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date and (b)
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the
timing requirement (i e , Acceptance Notice of Loan Denial, etc ) Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not
be binding upon title companies, lenders appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to
in writing by such non-party
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other (a)
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance, and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline

tAA

Pate)

(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline

3 Business Days after Acceptance

(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline

F p h m a r y 9th

(d) Loan Denial Deadline

NLA

(e) Appraisal Deadline

Ffthniary 9th ?007

(f) Settlement Deadline

Qn or before March 9th ?007

?007

(Date)
(Date)
(Date)
(Date)
(Date)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If
Seller does not accept this offer by 5 . 0 0 [ ] AM [ x ] PM Mountain Time on J a n u a r y 8 t h ? 0 0 7
(Date)
tbis-offer shalilapse, and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer
(gafe/s Signature)
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(Offer Date)

Seller's Initials

(Buyer's Signature)/ I

Date

"

Buyer's I m f a a l y ^ W

(Offer Date)

Pate./^/T?

The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date"

(Buyers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Notice Address)

(Zip Code)

J

(Phone)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified
above
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Seller's Signature)
(Notice Address)

(Date) (Time)
(Zip Code)

(Phone)

[ ] REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

***•*****•*-*• **-****•*-***-**-**** * * * * # • * • * • * * * • * * * * - * * + * * * * - * * * - * 4 - * * ****-*****•*•

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures
section below)

(Fill in applicable

A L acknowledge receipt of a final copy
copy ot
of the
the foregoing
foregoing uoj]trj3G>bearing
CqntjB^baaring all
all5ignatures
5ignature;

f

/fr&7
(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

/jKL (jXAry^
- c "

(Date)

/(^rfragWWfe)

(Seller's Signature)

v

///(/<r7
ODafej

(Date)

B I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ] faxed [ ] mailed I ] hand
delivered on
(Date), postage prepaid, to the [ J Seller [ J Buyer
Sent/Delivered by (specify)
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM
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Addendum F

SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THISSBJ^PINANCWG ADOENDIW b m^i£pirto

offer Kgt^w pate or January Bfr^q07

.t*t>^ Scy^^rif^nyWihnn

thePropertylocatedat, 7 0 4 S A f l f t i W I filffilft W a S h l n g t Q D j J I j f e E f f l L ^ W^rr^orihbAODENOUM
tre hereby fnootporsted ee part of the REFC.
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS* Setoft extension of credittoBuyer shall he evidenced by*, [XJ Note and De*d of Trust
I I Noitt and AlMndushre Deed of Trust I 10ther!

L CREDIT TERMS. T>ie tews of the credit documents referred its In Section 1 above era ** follows:
^SQJJ^JQQ
. prhctpa! amc wt of the note (the "Note');totanrttatfl.9
% per annum; payable atapproJdmately
«25lLQfiL—.p^rtJlQJlul
- TH* entire unpaid befcno-j of principal phis accrued interestfedue In SfiflLnwrthe
from date of the Note, Bret payment dueMflyJ fit g0f)7 .. Additional prfacfra! payments, &afloon payments or otter

term* ae follow:.
The crecffi documents refena iced in Section 1 of Vifc ADDENDUM wilt contain * due-on-wfo clausefrifevorof Seler, Seller
agreestoprovide to Buyer at Sefttoment: (a) an amortization echadute based on the above terms; <b) a written disdosum of
the total Interest Buyer will pay to mature of the Note; and (o) the annua! percentage rate on the Note based on loan doling
ooste.
1 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, In additiontothe payments referenced in Section Z above, Buyer shell also be reapoasuWe
foE (a) properly taxes; <b) homeowners association dues; (c) ipedal assessment*; mi (d) hazard insurance premiums on the
Property, These obligations will bo paid: [ IrfirectTyt6 S<rfterfE«cfvw Atfent on * monthly baste ( X I directly to the
applicable aounfy treasurer, aaeocurtton, and insurance company as required by those entfKws,
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 abo*? wlU be made to4. [ J Setter [XI an Escrow Agwrt, If an
Eaomw AqantTQP fay 6 U Y E R
wttl act as Escrow Aq*r& and will beresponsiblefor disbursing payments
on any underiytng mortgage or deed of true* (the "underlying mortgage*) and to the Seller. Cost pf eetting up the escrow account
shall be paid by. 1 1 Buyer ( I Setter [XI «rplft evenly between the partfes
6. LATC PAYWENT/PREPAT'fteNT* Any payment not made within j 5
days after it Is due is sub]** to a late chenjft
or
of $ N f t
.6 -u. W of tho Installment due, whichevertogreater. Amounts in defiivrtt shall bear InfAfeslfit& rata
offi
^ per annum All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty.
fc DUEON-SAl^- *s part of the Seller Dtedc^esreie^^
of the underlying mortgage, thertotesecured (hereby, and the atm>nWIo<t schedule. Buyera obftgafion to purchase under this
Contract I* conditioned upon Buyer's epproVal of the content of thoee documents, tn accordance with section e of tho REPC
If thefrotdtfrof the imdedytng mortgage ctfts the loan due GB a result of thtetartsactloniBuyer agrees to discharge the
underiymg loan as required by the mortgagetender,tn such event, Setter1* remaining eautty shall be prfd iu provided in the
credit documents.
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provide to Setter, as e wquJrwdpart of this ADD£NDUMt the attached BuyerRnenofel
Information Sheet euyer may use the Buyer Financial trtfwmation Sheet Approved by ttw Reat Eetate Commtesioh and the
Ptfmm QenGtafs Offtaa, or may provide comparaWe written Infemietlon in a dWteront format, together with such additional
Information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer W WILL [ ] WILL NOT provide Seller i<tth copies of IRS rctwm? for the
t#o preceding tax years. Buyer «*nowledgee that sefler may contact Buyer's current etnjHoyer for vsrlficatfon of eniploynient
aa rapretented by Buyer in $* Buyer Financial Information Sheet
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Soil* Dbcloeure Deadline referenced in Section 24<b) of the REPC, Buyer ehall provide to
6eller, at Buyer's expense, a aarent cwflt report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use trie omdit
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Sellers tnitiab

vm<

Buye^^ inmat^^v

0ate

report and the Information referencedtaSecfiun 7 of this Addendum ClBuy*r Disclosures'1)toevaluate tha cfedit-*A/orth!rraa8 of
Buyer,
M Seller Review, 9y the Evaluation* & Inspection* Deadline referenced In Section 24(c) of me R f f C , SaBar «h*B review
the credit report a*td thg Buyer D<aeto*urea te ilsiermine iftha oontent of the taedlt report and the Buyaf Dfccteuraa, it
sooepta&la, ffthe contort of meatxftnaportortrttB^^
(a) p w W e wrtten ob}ee«ona to Buyer ae provided ft Secflon B2 of tht$ ADDENDUM; or (b) Immediately cancel tlie REPC by
pnMding wridan notfce to Buyer BY the EvfihiaHaca & inspection* Deadfrw referenced in Sedlon 24<c) of the REPC, The
fcroterage, Upon reoe|jt of a oapy of Senate written nofloe of canoeflatkffl, tfiafl return to Buyer tfie Eameat Money Deposit
8.2 Seller Objection*, If Sailer does hot immediately cancel the R%t>C as provided above, Seller may, by the Evaluations
& Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 2^e) of the REPC, provide Buyer wfth written objection*. Buyer and Seller ahaft
b«v* eeven calendar daye after Buyer's roadpt of the obfeofcone (the Ttespon©© Period1) in wnlch fo egnse h writing upon the
manner of resolving Seta** objection*, Buyar may, but shall not be required to, resohfe Soto's ohjea&m* If Seier and Buyer
have not agreadfavvrWng upon the manner of reeoMng Saitoh objections, Salter may cancel the REPC by ptotfettng written
nofic^to Buyer no later than thna* caJendor^ay^atbrexpItaflonoftu^RGi^onsePtrlod The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy
of Seller's written notice of cancellation, sfiaB return to 8uyfcr \ht Earnest Money Deposit
6*3 Failure to Object tf Soller does not deliver a written objection w Buyer regardaig the credit report of a Buyer
Dfeclosiire by the Evaluation A l n a ^ ^
in Seotfons 8_1 or 6,2 of this ADDENDUM* the credit report end Buyer Ofectoeurw w3l be deemed approved by Salter.
9, TITLB INSURANCE* Buyer lX\ SHALL [ J SHALL NOT provide to Seler a lender** policy of title insurance in the amount
of thefodobtednneeto the Seller, and «ta!f payforauoh polfoy at Settlement
tO. DISCLOSURE OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER* By no later than Sfttttanerit, Buyer and Seller shall disdcao to
each othor their respective Soda) Security Numbers or other appfoabie tax Identification numbers so that they may comply wfth
federal tews on reportinj mortgage "*fWte$t Infilingswrlh the Internal Revenue Servtee,
To the extant the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any pcwialons of the REPC, Including all prior addtftda and
counteroffer, these terms shall oahtrol All otharteeme of the REPC, Including ell prior addenda ahd counteroffers, not modified
by this ADDENDUM «haH remain the came, [ X I Seller ( J Buy«r«hall have until
fiyQQ
f 1 A M pfl PM Mountain
H m o an J a n u a r y flT 2 0 0 7 _.. (Date), to accept the tarme of Wa SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM in accordance with
SeOfcq 2 3 / ftoe
«EPC> Unless
j^fjEPC*
Unless GO
GOacceptad,
acceptad,tfie
tfieoffer
offei ae eatforthIn this SBXEH FINANCING ADDENDUM shall tapaa.
r _

] Settw signature

t ) ^ Buyer
n feelter ^ n a t u r e
iyerjn^fedter^gnattira

'

/'&WIAA

(Da<«) (T»n« v

(Date) (Tiro)
(Hmo)

Sodal security Number

v
v

Sotawl Security Number

ACOeWAM^OOUNTEROfVER/RalEOTtON
CHECK O N &
{ ] ACCEPTANCB; [ 1 Seller! J euytr hereby accept these terms,

yj

COUNTfi&OFFH*: t I Seller ( J Buy*r presente as a counteroffer the termc eetforthon the attached ADDENDUM

NO. JL,

/wSijnalure)
[

^ ~

"

~

(Date) (Time)

(Sicnaturej

(Date) gi«»)

1 REJECTION: [ 1 Seller I 1 Buyer reject theforegoingSELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.

rSmna^)'

P«fle Z of 2 pagoG

(Dad) (Time)

^ I f e r 1 * Initial^

Date

(SijnAw)

(Datfe) (Time)

Buyer"« m t t r a l ^ ^ ^ _ O a t e ^ ^ ?

Addendum G

Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
DURHAM J O N E S & PDMEGAR

192 East 200 North, Thiid Floor
St George, Utah 84770
Phone:(435)674-0400
Fax:(435)628-1610
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
41483 04

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual,
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
V

ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual,

Case No 070500581

Defendant

Judge James L Shumate

The Court held a heaiing on cioss-motions foi partial summary judgment in the abovecaplioned mattei on Octobei 11, 2007 Plaintiffs were lepiesented by Michael Leavitt of the law
fiim of Duiham Jones & Pinegai Defendant was represented by Nathan Doiius of the law fiim
of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deeie The Couit reviewed the memoianda submitted by the
parties and heard argument
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT
Based upon the aigumeuts of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there rs
no dispute as tc the foVwing material facts*
STG_28041 1
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1

Defendant, Angela Johnson, ('"Defendant") is the ownei of pioperty located at

704 Soxith Anasazi Ciicle, Washington, Utah - the pioperty at issue in this case ("Residence")
2

Defendant listed the Residence foi sale on oi about December 1, 2006,

advertising the fact that she was willing to seller-finance the transaction at 4 9% pei annum
3

On oi about January 6, 2007, Plaintiffs, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson

("Plaintiffs") offeied to puichase the Residence from Defendant, offeiing to pay $1,100,000 with
Plaintiff paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, foi a total of $ 110,000 down
and Defendant sellei-financing $990,000
4

The Plaintiffs' offei was made on a standard Real Estate Puichase Contract form

appioved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate
5

Ihe initial offer specified that the puichase piice would be paid through sellei

financing and contained the following language:
Theie [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing
additional terms.. If theie are, the teims of the following addenda
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference [ ] Addendum
No I [X] Sellei Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan
Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some tiansactions this
disclosuie is iequiied by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in
some tiansactions this addendum is iequiied by law) [X] Othei
(specify) Notice of Inteiest Addendum.
6

Along with the initial offer, and to specify the teims of the sellei financing, the

Plaintiffs included a sellei financing addendum ("Seller Financing Addendum") that specified
that Defendant would provide seller financing foi the Residence in the principal amount of
$990,000 00 at 4 9% per annum for 360 months, with the first payment to begin May 1, 2007

STG 28041 1
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7

On 01 about January 8,2007, Defendant executed a counteioffei, listed as

Addendum No 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000 00 foi the purchase of the Residence and
"requiring a 72 houi time clause/option to keep the house on the market"
8

Addendum No, 2 specifically states:
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict
with any provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and
counter offers, these terms shall control All other teims of the
REPC, including all prioi addenda and counteroffers, not modified
by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same.

9

Defendant's counteioffer made no mention of the Seller Financing Addendum,

and made no changes to any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 7
above.
10

On that same date, the Plaintiffs executed Addendum No 3, counter -offering the

following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000, (b) in lieu of 72 houi clause, settlement to be 2-2307; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released to seller on 2-10*07; and (d)
all other terms and conditions to remain the same
11

On the same date, Defendant signed both the REPC and Addendum No 3, but

did not sign the Seller Financing Addendum
12.

In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from Plaintiffs' initial offer to the

final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or the Seller Financing
Addendum, which stated that Defendant would finance $990,000 as the seller and that Plaintiffs
would pay a total of $ 110,000 as a down payment
13

S7G_28041 1

The parties agreed to close on the sale of the Residence by February 23, 2007

3

14

On or about February 10, 2007, Defendant received the $20,000 earnest money

deposit check and negotiated it
15

Plaintiffs closed their end of the transaction on February 23, 2007 by signing,

among other documents, an All-inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $1,035,000 00 and
bringing $98,625 42 to the closing officer
16.

At closing on February 23, 2007, Defendant did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement

Statement because she did not agree with the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum
17

The transaction did not close on February 23, 200 7

18

Plaintiffs caused a Notice of Interest to be recorded against the Property after the

transaction did not close
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of
law:
1

A justiciable controversy and actual conflict exists between Plaintiffs and

Defendant with respect to whether Defendant is bound by the terms of the Seller Financing
Addendum, specifically whether she agreed to finance the purchase of the Residence at 4 9% per
annum
2

Plaintiffs and Defendant are adverse to each other with respect to this controversy

and conflict
3

Plaintiffs and Defendant each have an interest to protect with respect to this issue

4

The issue \s ripe foi judicial review

S1G_2804! I
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5

As a result of Defendant's signature to Addendum No 3, her acceptance of

Addendum No 3, and hei transmission of hei acceptance of Addendum No 3 to Plaintiffs,
Defendant agieed to the terms of the REPC and all addenda and coimteroffeis that were not
changed by the terms of Addendum No 3
6

These enforceable terms include the fact that Defendant agreed to seller-finance

the transaction at 4 9% per annum, as reflected in the Seller Financing Addendum
7-

Plaintiffs and Defendant were bound by the terms of the REPC, Seller Financing

Addendum, and Addendum No 3
8

Plaintiffs were not in breach of the REPC, Seller Financing Addendum, or

Addendum No 3, and peiformed in accordance with those documents
9.

The Notice of Interest that Plaintiffs caused to be recorded against the Pioperty

was authorized by Utah Code Ann 57-9-4, and therefore, is not a wrongful lien as stated in Utah
Code Ann Title 38, Chapter 9
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADIUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADIUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is DENIED

STG 28041 \
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DATED this

b

day of

2008

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH

District Court Judge

Approved as to form:
Bennett mellei lohnson & Deere

£an A Monsor
Jatha^S Doiius
v
Atfx5fneys foi Defendant

STG 28041 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I heieby certify that an unsigned copy of the foiegoing Order Granting Partial
Summary Judgment was served this uP

day of 1\YC{ I

prepaid upon the followingSean A Monson
Nathan S Doiius
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE

3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Legal Assistant

STG 28041 $
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2008, via U S Mail, postage

Addendum H

rft.SHlKGT0»4C0UHTV

Michael F. Leavitt (9476)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

192 East 200 North, Third Floor:
St. George, Utah 84770
Phone: (435) 674-0400
Fax:(435)628-1610
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

COPY
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual,
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 070500581

ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the abovecaptiorted matter on May 11, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Michael Leavitt of the law
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar, R C Defendant was represented by Sean Monson of the law
firni of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deere. The Court reviewed the memoranda submitted by
tne parties and heard argument.
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FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACT
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is
no genuine dispute of the following material facts:
1v

This Court has previously determined that the Real Estate Purchase Contract

("REPC") signed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, "Parties") on or about January 8,
2007, including all addenda and counteroffers, not changed by the terms of a document entitled
Addendum No. 3, was a binding agreement between the Parties.
2.

According to the REPC, the parties agreed to close the transaction on February

23, 2007.
3.

On February 23,2007, the Wilsons closed their end of the transaction, signed all

documents, and deposited the appropriate funds with the title company.
4.

On the same date, Defendant went to the title company and signed most of the

closing documents, but refused to sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement that was necessary to
close the transaction, and therefore, the transaction did not close.
5.

The REPC specifically states that in the event the seller defaults, in addition to

return of the earnest money deposit, buyer may elect either to accept from seller a sum equal to
the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue seller to specifically enforce the
contract to, or pursue other remedies available at law.
6.

The RJEPC also grants the prevailing party, in the event of litigation or binding

arbitration to enforce the REPC, an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
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7.

Plaintiffs were the buyers in the REPC and paid an earnest money deposit of

$20,000, which has been retained by Defendant, the seller identified in the REPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of
law:
1.

To prove breach of contract, a complaining party must show: (1) the existence of

a valid and enforceable contract, (2) performance by the Plaintiff; (3) breach of express
performance by the defendant; and (4) damages to the Plaiiitiff resulting from the breach. See
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrooke & McDonough. 2003 UT 9, Tf32, 70 P.3d 17.
2.

In the instant case, the REPC is a valid and enforceable agreement.

3.

Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations stated in the REPC.

4.

Defendant failed to perform her obligations in the REPC by failing to sign all

documents necessary to effectuate closing on the date agreed by the Parties.
5.

Plaintiffs were damaged by Defendant's failure to perform.

6.

Plaintiffs have elected their remedy for compensatory damages by seeking a

return of their earnest money deposit of $20,000, and an amount equal to that of $20,000, for
total compensatory damages of $40,000.
7.

Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action, and therefore, are entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs have
judgment against Defendant Angela Johnson in the amount of $40,000, plus interest at the postjudgment rate of 5.42% per annum until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are awarded
reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by affidavit of counsel for
Plaintiffs, and that this judgment may be augmented to include additional reasonable attorney's
fees and costs necessarily expended in the execution of this judgment.
DATED this

^ I

day of

ij ft ^1

2009.

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGE JAMES L. S t ^ A T l
District Court Judge
\ \
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was
served this

2009, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid upon the following.

Sean A. Monson
Nathan S. Dorius
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE

3165 R Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

Legal Assista
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